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THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE:
INTRINSIC OR EXTRINSIC FRAUD
RALPH ANZIVINO
The economic loss doctrine provides that when a product is sold and
results in economic loss for the buyer (no property or personal injury),
the buyer’s sole remedy is to sue for breach of contract, not in tort. The
two exceptions to the economic loss doctrine are contracts that are
predominately for services and contracts where a party is fraudulently
induced to enter into the contract.
Fraudulent inducement occurs when one party either fails to disclose a
material fact or knowingly misrepresents a significant fact, and thereby
induces the other party to enter into a contract. The fraudulent
inducement, however, may only be asserted as a claim against the
fraudulent perpetrator if the court determines that the fraud is extraneous
fraud and not intrinsic fraud. In other words, the fraud claim cannot be
raised against the tortfeasor in subsequent litigation if the fraud is
determined to be intrinsic fraud.
This Article serves two purposes. First, the Article explains the
difference between intrinsic fraud and extraneous fraud as required by the
economic loss doctrine. Second, the Article offers two recommendations
that attorneys must adopt to protect their client from intrinsic fraud if the
client is fraudulently induced to enter into a contract. Otherwise, the other
party’s fraudulent conduct will go unpunished.
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INTRODUCTION

The economic loss doctrine bars a contracting party from pursuing
tort recovery for solely economic losses associated with a contractual
relationship.1 In Wisconsin, the doctrine has been so widely applied that
it applies to virtually every type of contract with only two exceptions.2
One exception is a contract that predominantly involves services, and
the other is one that involves a narrow type of fraud in the inducement,
which is the subject of this Article.3 Only in those two limited
circumstances can a fraudulent inducement case proceed in court.4
Fraudulent inducement involves one party committing fraud either
by an affirmative misrepresentation or by failing to disclose a material
fact, thereby inducing the other party to enter into a contract under false
pretenses.5 Under the narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the
economic loss doctrine, a court must determine whether the fraud
committed by the offending party is intrinsic fraud or extraneous fraud.6
Only fraud that is considered extraneous to the contract can proceed as
a tort claim.7 If the court determines that the fraud is intrinsic fraud, the
tort claim will be dismissed, and only a breach of contract action, if
available, can thereafter proceed.8
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, the Article will
illustrate and explain how to distinguish intrinsic fraud from extraneous
fraud.
Intrinsic fraud is fraud that relates to the quality or
characteristics of the product or, otherwise, involves performance under
the parties’ contract.9 As one might expect, most fraud committed in

1. Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 27, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d
205.
2. Id. ¶ 42; Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361,
688 N.W. 2d 462.
3. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42; Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 52.
4. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42; Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 52.
5. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 33.
6. Id. ¶ 42.
7. Id.
8. Id. ¶ 35.
9. Id. ¶ 33.
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conjunction with a contract involves intrinsic fraud with the result that
the tort claim is barred.10 As a result, the only remedy left is a breach of
contract action.11 Unfortunately, many attorneys do not anticipate the
intrinsic fraud finding by a court and have not drafted the contract to
properly protect their client.12 The second purpose of this Article is to
recommend to counsel how to protect their client in the event intrinsic
fraud is committed and their only possible remaining remedy is a breach
of contract claim.
II. THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
The basic precept of the economic loss doctrine is that contract law
and, more particularly, the law of warranty is better suited than tort law
for addressing wrongs that involve only economic loss.13 There are three
policies underlying the economic loss doctrine.14 They are (1) to
maintain the basic distinction between tort and contract law so that each
is applied in its own realm; (2) to protect the parties’ freedom to allocate
the risks inherent in a transaction; and (3) to encourage the party best
situated to assess the risk in the transaction, and the buyer to be able to
assume, allocate, or insure against the risk.15
In 1989, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the economic loss
doctrine in the case of Sunnyslope Grading Inc. v. Miller, Bradford &
Risberg, Inc.16 In Sunnyslope, the court held that a commercial
purchaser of a product cannot pursue solely economic losses under
negligence or strict liability theories from a manufacturer.17
The first element that must be satisfied in applying the economic loss
doctrine is that the transaction must involve a product.18 Originally, the
product was understood to be a good that was subject to the protections
of the Uniform Commercial Code.19 Today, however, the definition of
the product has been so broadly interpreted by the courts to cover
10. See id. ¶ 33.
11. Ralph C. Anzivino, The Fraud in the Inducement Exception to the Economic Loss
Doctrine, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 921, 941 (2007).
12. See Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
13. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 28.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 148 Wis. 2d 910, 921, 437 N.W.2d 213, 217–18 (1989).
17. Id.
18. See Rodman Indus., Inc. v. G & S Mill, Inc., 145 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 1998).
19. Sunnyslope, 148 Wis. 2d at 920–21.
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virtually every type of transaction, except for a contract that
predominately involves services.20 For example, the economic loss
doctrine has been held to apply to a component part of an integrated
structure,21 the general contract for the construction of a home,22 the sale
of raw land,23 a sump and drain tile system,24 the sale of telephone
calling plans,25 a component of a manufactured product,26 the
construction of a 42-unit condominium complex,27 a commercial real
estate contract,28 and the grant of an option to purchase.29 When a
contract involves both services and non-goods, the courts use the
predominant purpose test to determine whether the economic loss
doctrine will apply.30 In other words, the court has to determine
whether the contract is predominately one for services or not.
The second element that must be satisfied is whether the damages
suffered are economic or involve personal injury or property damage.31
A prior article addresses the distinction between economic and noneconomic damages.32 Sunnyslope made clear that the economic loss
doctrine precluded a tort claim in negligence or strict liability when the
damages suffered were solely economic loss.33
But what went
unanswered for many years was whether the economic loss doctrine
would apply to preclude a tort claim for fraud in the inducement when
the damages suffered were solely economic loss.
20. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688
N.W.2d 462.
21. Bay Breeze Condo. Ass’n v. Norco Windows, Inc., 2002 WI App 205, 257 Wis. 2d
511, 651 N.W.2d 738.
22. Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189.
23. Mose v. Tedco Equities, 228 Wis. 2d 848, 598 N.W.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1999).
24. Komorowski v. Jeff Janssen Builders, Inc., 2006 WI App 244, 297 Wis. 2d 585, 724
N.W.2d 703 (unpublished disposition).
25. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 652.
26. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. Cty. Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999).
27. 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Grp., Ltd., 2006 WI 94, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 716 N.W.2d
822.
28. Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, 274 Wis. 2d 631, 683 N.W.2d 46.
29. Wickenhauser v. Lehtinen, 2007 WI 82, 302 Wis. 2d 41, 734 N.W.2d 855.
30. Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, ¶ 8, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189;
Biese v. Parker Coatings, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 18, 24–25, 588 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Ct. App. 1998).
31. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶ 33, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d
652.
32. See Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic
Loss From Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081 (2008).
33. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford and Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 921,
437 N.W.2d 213, 217–18 (1989).
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III. THE FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT EXCEPTION
States have generally taken three approaches to whether the
economic loss doctrine bars a claim for fraud in the inducement when
the aggrieved party has suffered only economic loss.34 Some states do
not recognize the exception and bar the fraud in the inducement claim
the same as a negligence or strict liability claim;35 some states provide a
general exception for all fraud in the inducement claims;36 and finally,
some states recognize only a very narrow fraud in the inducement
exception.37
The policy reasons supporting the economic loss doctrine are said to
be consistent with adopting the narrow fraud in the inducement
exception.38 First, the narrow exception preserves the distinction
between tort and contract law by requiring the parties’ contract to
address matters that relate to the quality or character of the product and
performance under the contract.39 Second, the narrow exception
respects the parties’ freedom to contract by holding the parties to the
terms of their contract.40 And finally, the narrow exception anticipates
that the party best able to assess the risks inherent in the contract will
address those risk and either assume, allocate, or insure against those
risks.41
Sixteen years after Sunnyslope, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted the narrow exception to the economic loss doctrine for fraud in
the inducement.42 It should be noted, however, that the Legislature
rejected the narrow exception only for residential real estate sales and
adopted the broad exception.43 The statute provides that a transferee in
a residential real estate transaction may maintain an action in tort
against a real estate transferor for fraud committed, or an intentional

34. Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 31, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d
205.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla.
1996); Wyle v. Lees, 33 A.3d 1187, 1191 (N.H. 2011); Huron Tool and Eng’g Co. v. Precision
Consulting Servs, 532 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
38. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 46.
39. Id.
40. Id. ¶ 48.
41. Id. ¶ 50.
42. Id. ¶ 42; see also Anzivino, supra note 11, at 933.
43. WIS. STAT. § 895.10 (2013–2014).
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misrepresentation made, by the transferor in the real estate
transaction.44
There are three primary components to the narrow fraud in the
inducement exception and each must be established.45 The first
component is that there must be an intentional misrepresentation.46
There are five elements to intentional misrepresentation that must be
proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence47 to establish an
intentional misrepresentation. First, the offending party must make a
factual representation.48 The representation can be by writing, word of
mouth, conduct, or even silence if there is a duty to speak.49 Second, the
representation must be untrue.50 Third, the offending party must have
made the representation knowing it to be untrue or made it recklessly
without caring whether it was true or not.51 Fourth, the representation
was made with the intent to deceive the other party and to induce the
other party to rely upon it.52 And fifth, the injured party believed the
offending party and relied upon the representation.53
The second component of the fraud in the inducement exception
requires that the aggrieved party prove that the intentional
misrepresentation occurred before the contract was formed.54 And
finally, the third component requires proof that “the fraud was
extraneous to, rather than interwoven with, the contract.”55 In other
words, fraud that is considered to be extraneous to the contract is not
barred by the economic loss doctrine, but fraud that is considered to be
interwoven with, or intrinsic to the contract, is barred by the economic
loss doctrine.56 Thus, a complaint that alleges and proves extraneous
fraud can proceed as a tort action; one that alleges only interwoven, or

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

WIS. STAT. § 895.10(2) (2013–2014).
Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42.
Id.
Wis. JI—Civil 205 (2012); Wis. JI—Civil 2401 (2014).
Wis. JI—Civil 2401 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d

205.
55. Id.
56. Id. ¶ 34.
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intrinsic fraud, will be dismissed; and only a breach of contract action, if
any, can proceed.57
Courts have attempted to sharpen the difference between intrinsic
fraud and extraneous fraud by providing various explanatory
statements.58 For example, a common explanation of the difference is
the statement that extraneous fraud concerns matters whose risk and
responsibility do not relate to the quality or the characteristics of the
goods under contract or otherwise involve performance of the
contract.59 Thus, it is apparent that the intrinsic/extraneous fraud
determination is based on a court identifying the intentional
misrepresentation and, then, determining whether the misrepresentation
relates to (1) the quality of the product; (2) the characteristics of the
product; or (3) otherwise involves performance under the contract.60
These are three separate and distinct areas of inquiry that the court
must consider when making the intrinsic/extraneous fraud
determination.61
Misrepresentations that relate to the quality of the product or its
characteristics are further explained to be either “expressly dealt with in
the contract’s terms” or if they are not dealt with explicitly in the
contract terms, they go to the reasonable expectations of the parties
regarding the risk that the product might not meet the buyer’s
expectations.62 Stated more succinctly, if the misrepresentation relates
to a matter expressly covered by the contract or was a foreseeable risk
inherent to the contract, the fraud will be deemed to be intrinsic fraud.63
IV. INTRINSIC FRAUD
When one party has made an intentional misrepresentation that has
induced the other party to enter into a contract, it must be determined
whether the fraud is intrinsic to the contract or extraneous to it.64 That
determination is made by identifying the intentional misrepresentation
and, then, determining whether the misrepresentation relates to (1) the
quality of the product, (2) the characteristics of the product, or (3)
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. ¶¶ 34–49.
See Anzivino, supra note 11, at 935.
Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 45.
See Anzivino, supra note 11, at 935.
Id.
Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 43.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 33–34.
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otherwise involves performance under the contract.65 If the intentional
misrepresentation relates to any of the three criteria, the fraud will be
considered to be intrinsic fraud.66 The result of an intrinsic fraud
determination is that any fraud claim will be barred by the economic
loss doctrine, and the aggrieved party can only proceed with a contract
claim.67 The courts have decided a number of cases under each of the
three criteria, and those cases are discussed below.68 In addition to
discussing the cases in each section, an explanation is provided to assist
in distinguishing each criterion from the other.69
A. Intentional Misrepresentations that Relate to the Quality of the
Product
Any intentional misrepresentations that relate to the quality of the
product are considered to be intrinsic fraud.70 A review of the cases
indicates that this is a complaint about whether the product functioned
the way it was represented to function.71 In other words, when the
product fails to perform or operate as represented, the
misrepresentation will be deemed to be one regarding the quality of the
product.72
For example in Barden v. Hurd Millwork Co.,73 buyers bought gasfilled, insulated glass products that were represented to be free from
defects for the life of the products.74 The buyers complained that the
seller made intentional misrepresentations in its brochures and other
sales material that falsely represented the insulation value of its
products.75 The court concluded that the fraud was interwoven with the

65. Anzivino, supra note 11, at 935.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 933.
68. See discussion infra Sections IV.1, IV.2, IV.3.
69. See discussion infra Sections IV.1, IV.2, IV.3. It should be further noted that a few
of the cases could arguably fit into more than one category, but the essential point is that if
they fit into any of the three categories, the fraud is intrinsic or interwoven.
70. Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d
205.
71. See discussion infra pp. 9–11.
72. See discussion infra pp. 9–11.
73. No. 06-C-46, 2006 WL 2560109 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 5, 2006).
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id.
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contract because the fraud related to the quality of the goods that were
the subject matter of the contract.76
In Borchardt v. Gore,77 the buyer purchased a used bulldozer from
the seller.78 At the time of sale, the seller advised the buyer that the
seller had replaced various parts in the machine and had no problem
operating it after installing the new parts.79 The seller’s statement was
false, and after a few hours of operation, the bulldozer stopped
working.80 The court dismissed the buyer’s fraud claim because the
seller’s fraud was interwoven with the contract.81 The court indicated
that the alleged fraud went to the quality of the product sold,
specifically, the bulldozer’s functional ability.82
In D & B Automotive Equipment, Inc. v. Snap-On, Inc.,83 a buyer
purchased a system called “the Shark,” which was a frame-straightening
system that would make accurate and consistent measurements when
repairing a vehicle.84 Unfortunately, the system woefully failed to
function as represented.85 The buyer’s complaint alleged that the seller
defrauded the buyer by engaging in a scheme that intentionally
misrepresented the capability of the system.86 The court concluded that
the fraud perpetrated was intrinsic fraud because the entire basis of the
fraud claims related to the false statements made about the Shark
system.87
In Neuser v. Carrier Corp.,88 a class action was brought by a number
of buyers who had purchased new furnaces from the seller.89 Although
the expected useful life of a furnace is twenty years, the heat exchangers
in the furnaces prematurely failed.90 The buyers alleged that Carrier
knew that the heat exchangers would prematurely fail and fraudulently
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at *4.
2011 WI App 114, 336 Wis. 2d 477, 801 N.W.2d 350 (unpublished disposition).
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
No. 03-CV-141, 2006 WL 776749 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *5.
No. 06-C-645-5, 2007 WL 1470855 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2007).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.
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withheld such information from the public.91 The court, however,
concluded that the fraud claim could not go forward because the
misrepresentation related to the quality of the goods.92
Finally in U-Line Corp. v. Ranco North America, LP,93 U-Line
purchased V16 valves from Ranco for use in U-Line’s refrigeration
units.94 Subsequently, the valves failed, and U-Line asserted that Ranco
made false statements regarding the compatibility of the V16 valve with
U-Line’s refrigerant.95 In addition, U-Line argued that Ranco also
committed fraud when it lied about whether other customers were
experiencing problems with the valves.96 The court concluded that the
fraud committed by Ranco was intrinsic fraud because the fraud related
to the quality of the valves.97
In each of these cases, the essence of the aggrieved party’s claim was
that the product did not function or operate as it was represented to
function. The misrepresentations were deemed to be intrinsic, or
interwoven, because these were product representations that could
have, and should have, been dealt with in the contract by the aggrieved
party.
B. Intentional Misrepresentations About the Characteristics of the
Product
Any misrepresentations that relate to the characteristics of a product
are also considered to be intrinsic fraud.98 These misrepresentations are
not about whether the product functioned as represented, but rather,
these representations are about whether the product received is the
product that was represented.99
Stated differently, the
misrepresentation is about whether the buyer received the product that
was described in the contract and not about the performance of that
product. The essence of the buyer’s complaint is that the buyer received

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at *7.
2006 WI App 78, 292 Wis. 2d 485, 713 N.W.2d 192 (unpublished disposition).
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
Id.
Id. ¶ 54.
See Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶ 48, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d

652.
99. See id.
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a different product than what was represented in the contract
negotiations.100
For example in S&C Bank v. Wisconsin Community Bank,101 S&C
Bank purchased a portfolio of loans in conjunction with the purchase of
a branch of Wisconsin Community Bank.102 Three of the loans
purchased were from a borrower who defaulted shortly after the
transaction closed.103 At the time of the sale of the branch and its
portfolio, the sellers represented that the borrowers on the loans
personally guaranteed them.104 It was subsequently learned that the
loans were not guaranteed.105 Thereafter, S&C sued and asserted a
claim for intentional misrepresentation.106 The court concluded that the
fraud committed was intrinsic fraud.107 In the court’s opinion, it was
“difficult to imagine a misrepresentation more interwoven with the
contract than this one.”108 In other words, the three loans were
represented by the seller to be guaranteed loans, but the loans actually
sold were not guaranteed loans. The product actually received by the
buyer was a different product than the one the seller represented it was
selling.
Also in Bob Thompson & Sons, Inc. v. Van Gorden,109 a buyer
purchased a large parcel of land on the Chippewa flowage with the
intent of subdividing the large parcel and selling individual lots.110 The
large parcel was connected to contiguous land by a narrow strip of land
that during high water periods would become submerged.111 After the
sale and as the buyer began to make a roadway over the sometimes
submerged land, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) stopped
the construction.112 The DNR indicated that the large parcel was
actually an island and not a peninsula as the buyer had anticipated.113 In
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id.
2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 233, 747 N.W.2d 527 (unpublished disposition).
Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id.
2010 WI App 1, 322 Wis. 2d 735, 778 N.W.2d 171 (unpublished disposition).
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.

190

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[99:179

the subsequent litigation, it was argued that the seller and the seller’s
agent intentionally misrepresented the nature of the parcel offered for
sale.114 The court concluded that the fraud, if any, was intrinsic because
the alleged misrepresentation involved the physical characteristics of the
property.115
Similarly in Shaw v. American State Equipment Co.,116 a buyer
bought a piece of used machinery that the seller represented had 7,000
hours of prior use.117 It was subsequently learned that the machine had
50,000 hours of use at the time of its sale.118 After the discovery of the
actual hours on the machine, the buyer sued on an intentional
misrepresentation claim seeking to rescind the sale and recover
damages.119 The court found that the seller had made an intentional
misrepresentation to the buyer.120 However, the court dismissed the
buyer’s fraudulent inducement claim because the fraud committed by
the seller was deemed to be intrinsic fraud.121
Along these same lines in Voyager Village P.O.A., Inc. v.
Letourneau,122 a buyer purchased a vacant lot in a development that was
subject to a recorded declaration of covenants.123 Several years later,
the buyer received a sales mailer indicating that the Home Owner’s
Association (the Association) would permit current owners to own up
to four lots, and the four lots could be combined to pay only one annual
assessment rather than four assessments.124 After the buyer purchased
three additional lots, the buyer received notice from the Association
that he would be required to pay four separate assessments on each of
his lots.125 The buyer refused to pay the assessments, and the
Association sued.126 The buyer defended the Association’s claim by
asserting a counterclaim based on intentional misrepresentation.127 The
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 16.
2007 WI App 138, 302 Wis. 2d 263, 732 N.W.2d 864 (unpublished disposition).
Id. ¶¶ 2, 5.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶¶ 5, 8.
Id.
2012 WI App 73, 342 Wis. 2d 250, 816 N.W.2d 351 (unpublished disposition).
Id. 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
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court noted that even if the Association made an intentional
misrepresentation, the fraud claim was barred by the economic loss
doctrine.128 The court reasoned that the fraudulent statements were
intertwined in the contract and, thus, intrinsic.129 The court specifically
noted that the representation regarding the merger of the four lots into
the single lot for assessment purposes clearly implicated the
characteristics of the lots.130
Finally in Roundy’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Nash-Finch Co.,131
Roundy’s sold two distribution centers to Nash, and thereafter, Nash
failed to pay some post-closing adjustments.132 Roundy’s sued, and Nash
defended the claim by asserting that Roundy’s had misrepresented the
value of the distribution centers.133 One issue before the court was
whether the misrepresentations regarding the value of the distribution
centers was intrinsic fraud or extraneous fraud.134 The court concluded
that any misrepresentations regarding the value of the distribution
centers that were the subject of the contract were clearly interwoven in
the contract and, thereby, intrinsic.135 In other words, the distribution
centers that were actually sold were different than what the seller’s
representations portrayed them to be.136
In each of these cases, the essence of the aggrieved party’s claim was
that the product it received was different than the product it was sold.
The misrepresentations were deemed to be interwoven or intrinsic
because these were product characteristics that could have, and should
have, been dealt with in the contract by the aggrieved party.
C. Intentional Misrepresentations that “Otherwise” Involve Performance
Under the Contract
The third criterion to be considered in making the
intrinsic/extraneous determination is whether the misrepresentation
“otherwise” involves performance under the contract.137 “Otherwise”
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 10.
No. 08C0142, 2008 WL 5377907 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 23, 2008).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d
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obviously means that the misrepresentation does not fall within the
“quality” or “characteristic” categories,138 which have already been
explained.139 These misrepresentations are not about the functioning or
operating capabilities of a product, nor about the description of the
product but, rather, are about other performance issues under the
contract.140 There are two different types of circumstances that fall
within this third criterion.141 A finding of either circumstance by the
court results in a determination of intrinsic fraud.142 First, are those
circumstances where the alleged fraudulent conduct is dealt with in the
contract and are not issues of “quality” or “characteristics” about the
product.143 Essentially, this criterion is the catchall for matters included
in the contract but don’t fit into the first two criteria.144 The second part
of the “otherwise” criterion includes those matters or risks that were not
dealt with in the contract but should have been because the matter or
risk was a foreseeable one.145 There are a number of cases that illustrate
each circumstance.146
There are three cases that illustrate intrinsic fraud that involve
matters that are covered by the contract but are not issues of “quality”
or “characteristics.” In Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp.,147 Digicorp
was an authorized dealer for Ameritech products, and requested
approval to sell an Ameritech calling plan called “Value-Link” through
a distributor that was not an Ameritech-authorized distributor.148
Ameritech approved the request, and a contract was negotiated between
the parties. The letter identified the sales people of the non-Ameritechauthorized distributor as “1099 employees.”149 The contract further
205.
138. Id.
139. See discussion supra Sections IV.1, IV.2.
140. See Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶ 48, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662
N.W.2d 652.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. Cty. Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 252–53, 593 N.W.2d 445,
454 (1999).
146. See, e.g., 1st Rate Mortg. Corp. v. Vision Mortg. Servs. Corp., No. 09-C-471, 2011
WL 666088 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 15, 2011); Superl Sequoia Ltd. v. C.W. Carlson Co., 535 F. Supp.
2d 931 (W.D. Wis. 2008); Digicorp, Inc., 2003 WI 54.
147. 2003 WI 54, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 652.
148. Id. ¶ 6.
149. Id. ¶ 7.
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provided that in the event any calling plan contracts were determined to
have forged signatures, Ameritech had the right to terminate the
contract.150 At the time of negotiating the Ameritech-Digicorp contract,
Ameritech was aware that one of the non-Ameritech-authorized
distributor’s sales people had a history of forging customers’ names on
calling plan contracts.151 Ameritech never disclosed that information to
Digicorp.152 A few weeks after sales began, it was discovered that the
sales person—who had a history of committing forgery—had forged
nearly 250 customers’ signatures.153 Pursuant to the contract, Ameritech
terminated Digicorp as an authorized distributor.154
Thereafter,
Digicorp sued Ameritech for intentional misrepresentation because of
its failure to disclose the history of the salesman that committed the
forgeries.155 The court indicated that its task was to determine whether
the fraud involved was extraneous to or interwoven into the contract.156
The court noted that the misrepresentation did not involve the actual
“Value-Link” service that was the primary subject matter of the contract
but, rather, which party would bear the risk and responsibility for the
1099 employees.157 Further, the court indicated that the contract
between the parties did address the responsibility for the 1099
employees.158 As a result, the court concluded that the fraudulent
behavior by Ameritech was interwoven with the subject matter of the
contract and intrinsic fraud.159 The court reasoned that Ameritech’s
misrepresentation concerned a matter that related to the performance
of the contract and, as such, was not extraneous to the contract
dispute.160
Similarly in Superl Sequoia Ltd. v. C.W. Carlson Co.,161 the parties
entered into a joint venture enterprise, and they agreed that they would
150. Id. ¶ 8.
151. Id. ¶ 6.
152. Id.
153. Id. ¶ 10.
154. Id. ¶ 11.
155. Id. ¶ 12.
156. Id. ¶ 53.
157. Id. ¶ 54.
158. Id. ¶ 60.
159. Id. ¶ 62.
160. Id.
161. 535 F. Supp. 2d 931 (W.D. Wis. 2008), partial summary judgment granted by, partial
summary judgment denied by, Superl Sequoia Ltd. v. C.W. Carlson Co., No. 07-CV-640-BBC,
2008 WL 2940734 (W.D. Wis. Jul. 22, 2008).
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share gross profits equally after both parties were reimbursed for their
costs.162 Prior to the formation of the contract, representations were
made regarding how each party would calculate its costs before sharing
profits.163 Thereafter, plaintiff did not calculate its costs according to the
pre-contractual representations, which became the basis of the
defendant’s fraudulent inducement claim.164 The parties’ contract,
however, did provide a definition on how costs were to be calculated
under the joint venture.165 Because the contract did specifically address
the alleged fraud in the inducement, the court concluded that the fraud
was interwoven into the contract and, thus, intrinsic fraud.166
Finally in 1st Rate Mortgage Corp. v. Vision Mortgage Services
Corp.,167 a part owner of 1st Rate Mortgage’s (1st Rate) business
negotiated a buyout of his interest with the other owners while
indicating that he was leaving the mortgage business.168 Unbeknownst
to the other owners of 1st Rate Mortgage, the departing owner was
secretly forming his own mortgage business and began soliciting 1st
Rate’s customers.169 1st Rate sued the departing owner and alleged
fraud as one of its claims.170 The court concluded that when the fraud
claim is based on the same conduct as the breach of contract claim, the
economic loss doctrine bars the tort claim.171 Essentially, if the contract
covers the conduct, the contractual remedy is the sole remedy and not
tort law.172
Furthermore, there are two cases that illustrate those matters or
risks that were not dealt with in the contract but should have been
because the matter or risk was a foreseeable one. In Schreiber Foods,
Inc. v. Lei Wang,173 an American seller and an agent for a Chinese entity
negotiated the sale of 200 tons of whey powder.174 The seller
subsequently shipped a different composition of whey to the buyer, and
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Superl, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
Id. at 935.
Id.
Id.
Id.
No. 09-C-471, 2011 WL 666088 (E.D. Wis. Feb 15, 2011).
Id. at *6.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
651 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 679.
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the buyer refused to pay for the shipment.175 Thereafter, the seller sued
the agent for fraudulent inducement on the grounds that the Chinese
buyer never intended to buy the whey despite the agent’s
representations to the contrary.176 The agent moved for summary
judgment on the fraud claim on the basis that the claim was barred by
the economic loss doctrine.177 The court indicated that the risk of
nonpayment was so obvious a risk that it should have been dealt with in
the contract.178 The court further indicated that extraneous frauds are
those risks that one would not expect to deal with in the contract.179
Thus, the risk of nonpayment should have been dealt with in the
contract, and any fraud relating to payment would be considered
intrinsic fraud.
In Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,180 Taurus brought an
action against DaimlerChrysler and Mercedes-Benz alleging patent
infringement.181 In response, DaimlerChrysler pled a counterclaim for
fraudulent inducement on the basis that in prior patent infringement
litigation between DaimlerChrysler and entities related to plaintiff, a
comprehensive settlement agreement was reached whereby all patent
disputes between the parties were resolved.182
Unknown to
DaimlerChrysler at the time of the negotiation of the prior settlement
agreement, the ‘658 patent, which was the subject matter of this
litigation, was transferred to a related entity that was not bound by the
prior settlement agreement.183 Taurus moved to dismiss the fraudulent
inducement claim as barred by the economic loss doctrine.184 The court
agreed that the tort claim should be barred because the fraudulent
inducement claim related to the scope of the settlement agreement.185
As a result, the fraud was found to be interwoven with the contract.186
175. Id. at 680.
176. Id. at 679–80.
177. Id. at 679.
178. Id. at 683.
179. Id. at 682.
180. 519 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D. Wis. 2007); patent interpreted by Taurus IP, LLP v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 07-C-158-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83510 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2007);
aff’d by 726 F.3d 1306, 2013 U.S. App. (Fed. Cir. 2013).
181. Taurus, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
182. Id. at 927.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 928.
186. Id.
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The court reasoned that DaimlerChrysler should have ensured greater
protection from future lawsuits by bargaining for a broader definition of
licensed technology in the settlement agreement.187 DaimlerChrysler’s
failure to protect itself in the contract from a foreseeable risk caused the
fraud to be categorized as intrinsic fraud.188
As illustrated, there are two different types of circumstances that fall
within this “otherwise” or third criterion. First, are those circumstances
where the alleged fraudulent conduct is dealt with in the contract and
are not issues of “quality” or “characteristics” about the product.
Second, are those circumstances where the contract fails to deal with
foreseeable matters or risks that were not dealt with in the contract, but
should have been because the matter or risk was a foreseeable one. A
finding of either circumstance by the court results in a determination of
intrinsic fraud.
V. EXTRANEOUS FRAUD
In 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the
intrinsic/extraneous fraud distinction for claimants asserting fraud in the
inducement in the case of Kaloti Enterprises v. Kellogg Sales Co.189 In
Kaloti, Kaloti was a wholesaler who purchased cookies from Kellogg to
subsequently resell to retail grocery stores.190 Kellogg and Kaloti had a
prior course of dealing with each other.191 At some point, Kellogg
decided to change its marketing approach and intended to sell directly
to the retail grocery stores rather than through wholesalers.192
Thereafter, Kellogg solicited a large sale of cookies to Kaloti without
disclosing that Kellogg had changed its marketing approach, which
would essentially eliminate the ability of Kaloti to resell its cookies to
the grocery stores.193 In fact, after Kaloti paid for the cookie order,
Kaloti’s major customers advised Kaloti that they would no longer be
buying cookies from Kaloti, but rather, they would be buying them
directly from Kellogg.194 Because Kaloti was unable to resell the

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
See id.
2005 WI 111, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
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cookies, Kaloti suffered a loss in the amount of $100,000.195 Kaloti sued
to recover its loss on the theory that Kellogg’s failure to disclose the
change in marketing strategy constituted fraud in the inducement to the
cookie contract.196 Kellogg defended on the ground that Kellogg had no
duty to disclose its change in marketing strategy to Kaloti, and in either
event, the economic loss doctrine barred Kaloti’s misrepresentation tort
claim.197 The court concluded Kellogg did have a duty to disclose its
change in marketing strategy to Kaloti.198 As a result, Kellogg’s failure
to disclose constituted a fraudulent inducement that induced Kaloti to
enter into the cookie agreement.199 Nevertheless, Kellogg asserted that,
because Kaloti’s damages were solely economic, the economic loss
doctrine barred any tort claim, including fraud in the inducement, by
Kaloti.200 The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed and adopted the
narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss
doctrine.201 In other words, only fraud in the inducement claims that are
extraneous to the parties’ contract are actionable in tort.202 The court
defined extraneous fraud as fraud that “concerns matters whose risk and
responsibility [do] not relate to the quality or the characteristics of the
goods for which the parties contracted, or otherwise involves
performance of the contract.”203 Essentially, the court’s definition was
that extraneous fraud is simply not intrinsic fraud.204 However, the court
provided a more useful indication of extraneous fraud when it stated
that the relevant inquiry is to examine the relationship between the
inducing representation and the essential requirements of the
contract.205
Stated differently, if the inducing misrepresentation
concerns matters or risks that are dealt with in the contract or should
have been dealt with in the contract because the matter or risk was
foreseeable, the misrepresentation is intrinsic fraud.206 On the other
hand, if the inducing misrepresentation does not concern matters or
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. ¶ 9.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 42.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 43.
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risks that are dealt with in the contract or matters or risk that were not
foreseeable at the time of contracting, the misrepresentation is
extraneous fraud.207 Applying the extraneous fraud standard to the case,
the court concluded that the intentional misrepresentation committed
by Kellogg was extraneous fraud.208 The court remarked that the
inducing misrepresentation did not concern any performance under the
contract, nor the quality or characteristics of the cookies sold.209 Rather,
the court noted that the inducing misrepresentation related to a matter
or risk that was never contemplated to be part of the contract.210
Further, the court reasoned that the change in marketing strategy is not
a matter that was dealt with in the contract, nor would one expect that
to have been dealt with in the contract.211 To further amplify the
difference between intrinsic fraud and extraneous fraud after Kaloti,
another court quipped that had the Rice Krispy treats that Kellogg sold
to Kaloti turned out to be strawberry rice bubbles (an Australian
version of the Rice Krispy treat) that would have been intrinsic fraud.212
After Kaloti, there are a few other cases that have found extraneous
fraud. In Wickenhauser v. Lehtinen,213 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
was again faced with the intrinsic/extraneous fraud determination. In
Wickenhauser, the Wickenhausers, who had a farming operation,
borrowed money from Lehtinen on a number of occasions and gave
Lehtinen a mortgage on their 300-acre parcel to secure their loans.214
Thereafter, Lehtinen presented an option to purchase to the
Wickenhausers, which gave Lehtinen the right to purchase the 300 acres
for three years.215 Lehtinen told the Wickenhausers that he would not
record the option and that the option was just a form of additional
collateral to secure their loans.216 Thereafter, Lehtinen exercised the
option and the Wickenhausers refused to sell.217 In the prior case
between the same parties, the court ruled for the Wickenhausers and

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
White v. Marshall, 693 F. Supp. 2d 873, 880 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
2007 WI 82, 302 Wis. 2d 41, 734 N.W.2d 855.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6.
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rescinded the option.218 In this case, the Wickenhausers sought damages
for the alleged fraud committed by Lehtinen in inducing them to grant
the option to purchase.219 The court noted that the Wickenhausers’
claim was for an intentional misrepresentation that induced them to
grant the option to Lehtinen.220 Further, the court reasoned that the
fraud was extraneous because the inducing misrepresentations related to
the option to purchase and did not relate to the loan contract, which was
the primary contractual relationship between the parties.221 As a result,
the tort case was permitted to go forward.222
A less convincing case of extraneous fraud is Triad Group, Inc. v. ViJon, Inc.223 In Triad, Vi-Jon and Triad had an ongoing relationship
whereby Vi-Jon provided raw materials to Triad, Triad would purchase
additional raw materials, and then Triad would manufacture a final
product for Vi-Jon.224 In 2011, the parties again entered into a
continuing contractual relationship for the manufacture by Triad of the
final product.225 Subsequently, the government seized a number of
products at Triad’s production facility due to contamination.226 As a
result of the seizure, Vi-Jon terminated its contract with Triad, and
litigation ensued between the parties.227 During the litigation, Vi-Jon
alleged that Triad committed fraud in the inducement because at the
time of renewing their contractual relationship, Triad failed to disclose a
pending FDA investigation to Vi-Jon.228 The court concluded that
Triad’s fraud was extraneous because Vi-Jon’s complaint was not about
the completed product, but rather, it was about Triad’s inability to
perform on the contract.229 It is true that the complaint was not about
the quality of the completed product or its characteristics.230 But, the
third criterion for intrinsic fraud is about performance under the

218.
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224.
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226.
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contract, to which Triad’s fraud is directly related.231 In fact, the court
acknowledged that Vi-Jon’s complaint was “closely related to Triad’s
performance on the contract.”232 Although the court stated that the
fraud in Triad was akin to the fraud in Kaloti, the cases are really not
parallels. The standard set by Kaloti is to examine the relationship
between the inducing misrepresentation and the essential requirements
of the contract.233 The inducing misrepresentation in Kaloti was the
failure to disclose a change in marketing strategy that would affect
Kaloti’s ability to resell the cookies to a third party.234 No one would
have expected Kaloti to address in its contract, with Kellogg, any issues
about Kaloti’s ability to sell its cookies to third parties. On the other
hand, in Triad the inducing misrepresentation was directly about Triad’s
ability to perform on the contract between Triad and Vi-Jon.235 Vi-Jon
should have protected itself with warranties regarding performance
under the contract. Performance issues would certainly be foreseeable
ones that should have been addressed in the contract, and any fraud
related to performance issues is intrinsic fraud. It is certainly arguable
whether Triad is truly a credible case of extraneous fraud.
On the other hand, in Zimmerman v. Logemann,236 a court found
both intrinsic fraud and extraneous fraud in the same transaction. In
Zimmerman, the Zimmermans alleged that their mortgage broker,
appraiser, and lenders falsified plaintiffs’ financial information and
knowingly inflated the appraisal of the property the Zimmermans
wished to purchase in order to dupe them into accepting a home loan
that they could not afford.237 The Zimmermans sued the defendants on
a number of theories including fraud in the inducement.238 The
Zimmermans identified the following misrepresentations as the basis of
their fraudulent inducement claim:
(1) defendants . . . promised plaintiffs that the monthly mortgage
payment would be less than $ 1000;
(2) defendants . . . inflated plaintiffs’ income on the application
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d
205.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. ¶ 9.
Triad, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 653.
No. 09-CV-210-slc, 2009 WL 4407205 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 30, 2009).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.
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form without their knowledge;
(3) defendants . . . promised plaintiffs that refinancing would be
available the following year;
(4) defendants . . . knowingly appraised the property at higher
than fair market value;
(5) defendants represented to plaintiffs that they qualified for
the mortgage;
(6) defendants failed to disclose that one of the mortgages
included a prepayment penalty;
(7) defendants failed to disclose that one of the mortgages
contained a balloon payment;
(8) defendants failed to “check or confirm” plaintiffs’ income
before approving the loan. 239
The Kaloti test for distinguishing intrinsic from extraneous fraud is
to examine the relationship between the inducing misrepresentation and
the essential requirements of the contract.240 If there is a relationship,
and the matter is or should have been covered by the contract, the fraud
is intrinsic.241 In Zimmerman, the contract entered into by the
Zimmermans was a mortgage contract.242 The court first noted that the
misrepresentations about the mortgage payment being less than $1,000
(#1), the failure to disclose the prepayment penalty (#6), and the failure
to disclose the balloon payment (#7) were about the terms of the
mortgage and, as such, were clearly intrinsic fraud.243 Further, the court
observed that the defendants failure to “check or confirm” plaintiffs’
income before approving the loan (#8) was not a misrepresentation at
all but a failure to act.244 Finally, the court concluded that items (#2)–
(#5) were extraneous fraud.245 Clearly, inflating the Zimmermans’
income on the application form (#2), artificially inflating the value of the
appraisal (#4), and advising the Zimmermans that they qualified for the
loan (#5) were not matters that were or would be expected to be in the
loan contract, and as such, they were fairly determined to be extraneous
fraud. The misrepresentation regarding the promise that refinancing
239. Id. at *9.
240. Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d
205.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. ¶¶ 34, 42.
Zimmerman, 2009 WL 4407205 at *3.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
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would be available the following year (#3) is not a factual representation
at all but, rather, a statement about the future and, as such, cannot be
the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation.246 Nevertheless, the
Zimmerman case is an excellent illustration of how a court distinguishes
intrinsic fraud from extraneous fraud.
VI. PROTECTING YOUR CLIENT FROM AN INTRINSIC FRAUD
DETERMINATION
A review of the preceding cases makes clear that a finding of
intrinsic fraud is the most likely outcome when the issue before the
court is whether the fraud is intrinsic or extraneous. In fact, it is logical
to expect that most fraud would be about the quality of the product, the
product’s characteristics, or other bargained for performances expected
under the contract. The effect of such a finding is that the fraud claim is
barred by the economic loss doctrine and the sole remedy remaining for
the aggrieved party is to sue for breach of contract.247 Unfortunately, in
many cases the aggrieved party’s attorney did not anticipate an intrinsic
fraud finding by the court and did not lay the basis for a breach of
contract action.248 As a result, the client is often left without a remedy
against the perpetrator, and the only remaining remedy is to sue the
offending attorney for malpractice.
There are many cases that expose this failure to prepare the contract
claim as a backup to the tort claim in the event the court determines that
the alleged fraud is intrinsic fraud. In Shaw v. American State
Equipment Co.,249 the buyer purchased a piece of used machinery from
the seller who represented that the machine had 7,000 hours of prior
use.250 Upon learning that the machine had 50,000 hours of use,251 the
buyer sued for intentional misrepresentation.252 The lower court
awarded the buyer $60,000 in damages on the tort claim.253 On appeal,
the court concluded that the intentional misrepresentation was intrinsic

246. Wis. JI—Civil 2401 (2014).
247. Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶¶ 34–35, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699
N.W.2d 205.
248. See Budgetel Inns v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
249. 2007 WI App 138, 302 Wis. 2d 263, 732 N.W.2d 864 (unpublished disposition).
250. Id. ¶ 5.
251. Id.
252. Id. ¶ 1.
253. Id. ¶ 2.
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fraud,254 reversed the lower court award, and dismissed the buyer’s
complaint.255 The buyer’s complaint did not allege a backup claim for
breach of contract.256
In Gould v. Mitchell,257 Gould entered into an investment agreement
based on representations that his monies would be used to pay
attorney’s fees and develop prototypes; that the company had been in
business for 10 years; and that the company had several new products at
various stages of development.258 All these representations were false.259
Upon discovery of the false representations, Gould sued in tort, alleging
fraud.260 The court concluded that the fraud was intrinsic fraud and
affirmed the dismissal of Gould’s tort action.261 Gould’s complaint did
not allege a backup claim for breach of the investment contract.262
In Creekwood Farms, Inc. v. Daybreak Foods, Inc.,263 the buyer and
seller entered into a contract for the sale of the seller’s business.264 The
contract anticipated that the buyer would need to secure financing to
complete the sale.265 Prior to signing the contract, the buyer made
representations that it would not be a problem for the buyer to secure
financing.266 Based on that representation, the seller entered into the
contract.267 At the time of the signing of the contract, however, the
buyer failed to disclose that the buyer had to sell another property in
order to get the financing.268 When the buyer failed to secure financing,
the seller sued the buyer for fraud, breach of good faith, and breach of
best efforts.269 The lower court dismissed the seller’s complaint.270 On
appeal, the appeals court affirmed the dismissal of the fraud claim on
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the basis that the alleged fraud was intrinsic fraud and barred by the
economic loss doctrine.271 The court also found no merit in the breach
of best efforts and good faith claims.272 Again, the contract was not
drafted so as to anticipate an intrinsic fraud finding and preserve a
breach of contract claim.273
These cases and others like them indicate that the unmistakable tort
claim can be fool’s gold in that the attorney’s primary focus is on the
fraudulent misrepresentation, when it should have originally been on
the contract. A misrepresentation is not a breach of contract.274 Rather,
to make a misrepresentation a breach of contract, the representation
must be brought into the contract.275 This point is particularly
compelling when one is dealing with intrinsic fraud. A finding of
intrinsic fraud means that the misrepresentation claim is dismissed
pursuant to the economic loss doctrine, and if that representation has
not been brought into the contract, there is also no breach of contract
claim.276 For example in Shaw, if the contract contained the simple
representation that the machine had 7,000 hours use, the case could
have proceeded on a contract claim even though it was dismissed as a
tort claim. Also in Gould, had the various representations made by the
seller been brought into the contract, the case would have proceeded as
a breach of contract action despite the dismissal of the tort claim.
Because of the likelihood that most misrepresentations will be found to
be intrinsic fraud, it is essential that the attorney incorporate any and all
representations made by the other party into the contract to provide a
basis for a breach of contract action.
The case of S&C Bank v. Wisconsin Community Bank,277 illustrates
the wisdom of having a breach of contract action as a backup claim in
the event the court dismisses the fraud claim as intrinsic fraud. In S&C,
S&C Bank purchased a bank branch from Wisconsin Community
Bank.278 Also involved in the sale was Wisconsin Community Bank’s
parent bank, Heartland Bank.279 During the sale, several loans that
271.
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273.
274.
275.
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were in Wisconsin Community’s portfolio were represented to be
guaranteed loans, which turned out to be false.280 Upon default of those
loans, S&C brought an action against Wisconsin Community for breach
of contract and against Heartland for intentional misrepresentation.281
At trial, the jury awarded $2.1 million against each defendant.282 Both
appealed and on appeal, the court determined that the fraud committed
by Heartland was intrinsic fraud.283 The result of the intrinsic fraud
finding was that the intentional misrepresentation claim against
Heartland was barred by the economic loss doctrine.284 Significantly,
however, the $2.1 million judgment against Wisconsin Community that
was based on the breach of contract theory was affirmed.285 This case
illustrates the fact that an attorney can no longer rely upon a fraud
theory to remedy a wrong committed against a client. It is absolutely
essential to include any and all representations into the contract because
the fraud claim, in all likelihood, will be barred by the economic loss
doctrine.
Placing greater emphasis on including any and all representations
into the contract only addresses part of the problem presented by an
intrinsic fraud finding. It has always been a foundational principle of
contract drafting to include in the contract the representations and
warranties relied upon in forming the contract. Now, much greater
importance is placed upon that principle because any fraud claim, unless
it is extraneous fraud, will be dismissed. But an even more problematic
part of the intrinsic fraud issue is the situation where a party fails to
disclose a material fact. For example in the Creekwood case noted
above, the buyer never disclosed to the seller that there were limits on
the ability of the buyer to get financing, and the seller went forward with
the contract without the knowledge of those limitations.286 Eventually,
the buyer was unable to get financing because of the undisclosed
limitations, and the seller sued the buyer for the fraud committed by
concealing the limitations.287 The court concluded that the fraud was
280. Id. ¶ 19.
281. Id.
282. Id. ¶ 20.
283. Id. ¶ 27.
284. Id. ¶ 4.
285. Id.
286. Creekwood Farms, Inc. v. Daybreak Foods, Inc., 2007 WI App. 34, ¶ 2, 299 Wis. 2d
783, 728 N.W.2d 374 (unpublished disposition).
287. Id. ¶ 4.
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intrinsic fraud and dismissed the tort claim.288 Absent a breach of
contract claim as an alternative to the tort claim, Creekwood’s
complaint was dismissed.289
The way to address this problem is to turn a failure to disclose a
material fact into a breach of contract. An example of a clause that is
neutral and would accomplish this task is as follows: Both parties
understand that they each have a duty to disclose any and all material
facts about this transaction to the other party, and each hereby
represents that each party has disclosed any and all material facts about
this transaction to the other party.
The simple inclusion of the foregoing clause will cause a failure to
disclose a material fact to become a breach of contract and avoid the
trap of an intrinsic fraud determination. In sum, an attorney can avoid
the perils of an intrinsic fraud finding by simply following two simple
recommendations. First, it is imperative to include any and all
representations made between the parties into the contract, which will
thereby lay the basis, if needed, for a breach of contract action. Second,
it is just as important to include a clause, such as the foregoing, in every
contract, which will thereby ensure that the other party’s failure to
disclose material information will be a breach of contract. Such an
approach will insure that either an affirmative misrepresentation or a
failure to disclose a material fact will support a breach of contract action
and protect your client from an intrinsic fraud determination that
dismisses the tort claim.
VII. CONCLUSION
Far too often, one party fraudulently induces another to enter into a
contract by either affirmatively misrepresenting or by failing to disclose
a material fact. Naturally, an attorney’s first instinct is to remedy the
wrong through a fraudulent inducement claim. Unfortunately, when the
only damages suffered are economic, as opposed to personal injury or
property damage, the economic loss doctrine will most likely be used to
preclude the tort remedy.290 Wisconsin courts permit a fraudulent
inducement claim to go forward only when the fraudulent conduct is

288. Id. ¶ 8.
289. Id. ¶ 1.
290. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶ 45, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d
652.
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considered to be extraneous as opposed to intrinsic.291 Since intrinsic
fraud concerns any fraud related to the quality or character of the
product or other performance under the contract, most fraudulent
inducements claims are intrinsic fraud.292
The net effect of an intrinsic fraud determination is that the only
remaining remedy is through a breach of contract action.293 In most
cases, the parties contract will not have anticipated a fraud being
perpetrated in the transaction and may not support a breach of contract
action.294
With the advent of this intrinsic/extraneous fraud
determination, it is essential that the attorney has prepared the contract
with the possibility that intrinsic fraud may have been an inducement to
the contract.
There are two means available to an attorney to preserve a breach of
contract action in the event intrinsic fraud has been committed. First,
the attorney must insert in the contract any and all representations that
may have been a basis of the contract for the client. Although that has
always been a primary principle in contract drafting, it has become even
more important with the advent of intrinsic fraud. Second, it is also as
important to insert a clause that will require each party to disclose any
and all material facts about the transaction and to represent that they
have done so. By following these two simple recommendations, the
attorney will have done everything possible to preserve a breach of
contract action in the event of an intrinsic fraud determination by a
court.

291. Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d
205.
292. Id.
293. Id. ¶ 34.
294. Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (E.D. Wis. 1998).

